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Self-interest and organizational performance: an empirical examination with 
U.S. and Brazilian managers 
 
ABSTRACT 
The literature has drifted towards a polarized view of managers as either individuals 
concerned with mitigating self-interest (e.g. agency and organizational politics theories) or 
individuals who actively motivate and engage team members in the pursuit of common 
organizational goals (e.g. shared cognition and justice theories).  Using a survey sample of 
419 U.S. and Brazilian managers, we propose and find instead that managers exhibit complex 
attitudes and behaviors that do not reflect a single perspective of human behavior in the 
workplace.  Managers who perceive self-interest to be common are not necessarily less 
concerned with other issues unrelated to self-interest (e.g. fairness and adequate treatment for 
team members).  Managers also appear to adopt behaviors that blend recommendations 
consistent with multiple theories.  For instance, we find that managers who are concerned 
with justice not only emphasize practices to foster justice, but also practices that directly 
follow from agency theory (such as performance evaluation and incentives); and the joint 
emphasis in those practices appear to positively influence organizational performance.  By 
outlining the predictions of distinct theories and exploring their possible interactions, our 
study contributes with a more complete picture of the interplay between managerial attitudes, 
managerial behavior and performance.   
Key words 
Self-interest, opportunism, agency theory, organizational politics, shared mental models, 
justice 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the pursuit of explaining the relation between managerial practices and the 
performance of organizations, scholars have made diverse assumptions regarding managers’ 
interpersonal attitudes and the influence of such attitudes on their behavior in the workplace. 
Some scholars, emphasizing the hazards of shirking (e.g. agency theory: Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Lazear, 2000) and self-serving political behavior (Ferris et al., 1989; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1990), depict managers as individuals who perceive or anticipate 
potential self-interest by their subordinates; based on these beliefs, managers then act by 
imposing formal governance mechanisms such as incentives, supervision, and organizational 
rules.  Other scholars contend that this view of managers is a “narrow one” (Donaldson, 1990: 
372); these scholars then propose alternative theories of managerial behavior which either 
reject or dispense with the assumption of self-interest (e.g. Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Davis 
et al., 1997; Donaldson, 2008; Frey and Jegen, 2001). In these views, managers would be 
better off motivating team members through diverse actions such as the communication of 
common goals and the establishment of procedures that are perceived as fair  (Folger, 1986; 
Korsgaard et al., 1995; Levesque et al., 2001; Mesquita and Brush, 2008).  As Ghoshal and 
Moran (1996: 38) put it, managers concerned with opportunism “will be distracted from the 
business of generating the collective energy of their organization and focusing it on the task 
of running a business.”  
We submit that the received portrait of managers as either opportunism-controllers or 
active-motivators does not pay justice to the much more complex set of attitudes and 
behaviors that can be found in actual organizations.  It is not clear whether managers really 
follow a single perspective on human behavior or instead attempt at combining managerial 
practices that they perceive to be performance-enhancing.  Also, because managers interact 
with their subordinates in myriad ways and instances, there is room for multiple perceptions   3
depending on the particular context in which parties are interacting (Lewicki et al., 1998).
1  
Lastly, from a practical standpoint, if the discipline of strategic management is to be of any 
service to managers regarding how particular practices lead to advantages in the marketplace, 
one needs to examine in a broader sense how attitudes and their consequential behaviors 
influence the ability of the firm to meet or exceed established goals (Gottschalg and Zollo, 
2007).              
We contribute to this debate by jointly analyzing alternative theories of managerial 
attitudes and behavior, and the performance implications of their prescriptions for managerial 
action.  We present hypotheses based on theories that view managers’ actions as an attempt to 
address self-interest on the part of their subordinates (e.g. agency theory), and theories that 
identify sources of concern, other than self-interested behavior, that may emerge in 
intraorganizational interactions (e.g. justice theory).  We then admit the possibility of mixed 
attitudes and behaviors by discussing how managers may engage in behaviors that are 
consistent with perceptions of both self-interest and other problems not strictly related to self-
interest.  For instance, we model how managers who strive for a fair treatment for the 
subordinates may also emphasize performance evaluation and reward schemes (behaviors that 
typically follow from agency theory) as a way to establish clear goals at the outset, provide 
useful feedback for team members, and praise those who excelled.          
We test our hypotheses using a survey with 419 managers from the United States and 
Brazil, working in distinct industries and functions.  Because distinct cultural traits (Hofstede, 
1997) and various task characteristics in the work environment (Hackman and Wageman, 
1995) should influence perceptions of how people behave, collecting data from two distinct 
                                                 
1 Consider, as an illustration, the story reported by Ellis (2008) about how John L. Weinberg, former senior 
partner of Goldman Sachs and considered a person of “affable manner” (p. 297) who inspired “trust and 
affection” (p. 193), reacted to an event when Eric Dobkin, responsible for stock underwriting, closed an 
important deal with the British government in the 1980s.  As Ellis writes: “Weinberg called Dobkin: 
‘Congratulations, Eric. You’ve just won the largest and most important privatization in history.  This is very 
good news.  We’re all very proud of you and what you’ve done—so far.’ Then, in the typical Goldman Sachs 
manner, his tone hardened: ‘Eric, don’t screw this one up.  Don’t make any mistakes. We’ll all be watching 
you—and counting on you to do everything just the right way’” (p. 355).    4
countries and from managers involved in diverse functions allows us to increase the range of 
attitudes and behaviors that can be observed in practice.  Although we examine how 
responses vary across those two subsamples, our goal is neither to propose nor test hypotheses 
related to country-specific effects.     
Our study makes inroads into the psychological foundations of strategy in two ways.  
First, we describe and assess empirically the diverse range of attitudes that managers may 
develop in the workplace, and how these attitudes explain managerial behavior.  Our results 
indicate that managers exhibit complex patterns of attitudes and behaviors which cannot be 
explained by a single theoretical perspective.  Second, we expand current research on 
managerial attitudes by grounding these attitudes in particular managerial paradigms, showing 
how the substantive content of attitudes can affect organizational performance.  More 
specifically, our study unveils paths through which managerial assessments of their 
subordinates affect the actions that they emphasize in their day to day work lives, and how 
these actions lead to outcomes that exceed or not managers’ initial expectations.  Therefore, 
we contribute to the evolving literature that attempts to examine sources of competitive 
advantage emanating from distinct managerial attitudes and behaviors (e.g. Barney and 
Hansen, 1994; Gottschalg and Zollo, 2007; Nickerson and Zenger, 2008).   
In the next session, we present key alternative theories of managerial attitudes and 
behaviors—based on the assumption of self-interest (agency and organizational politics) and 
not based on that assumption (shared cognition and interactional justice)—, discuss their 
possible associations, and outline their implications for organizational performance.  We then 
describe the results of an international study carried out to test these hypotheses, with 
particular emphasis on how distinct managerial perspectives jointly contribute to explain 
organizational behaviors and performance. We conclude by outlining our contributions for 
theory and practice.   5
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to model managerial attitudes and behaviors and how they associate with 
organizational performance, we leverage theory elements that are based on distinct behavioral 
assumptions regarding the self-interestedness nature of human action. Some theories rest on 
the assumption that individuals try to maximize their own gains—“personal wealth, status, 
leisure and the like” (Donaldson, 1990: 371)—even at the expense of others in the 
organization.  Williamson (1985) even proposes an extreme form of self-interested behavior, 
which he terms opportunism or “self-interest seeking with guile” (p. 47).  Other theories 
dispense with this assumption and identify alternative sources of conflict even when actors do 
not necessarily try to maximize their own gains and are instead concerned with other issues 
(e.g., actors may value fairness in social interactions).  We thus present predictions from each 
theory based on the following logic: depending on managers’ propensity to evaluate others in 
the organization as self-interested or not—i.e., managers’ attitudes towards the self-
interestedness of others—they are likely to emphasize distinct managerial actions to address 
the source of conflict and increase organizational performance—i.e., they are likely to behave 
in ways that are consistent with their attitudes (e.g. Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). 
We do not imply that attitudes towards self-interestedness are the sole determinants of 
managerial action; other contextual or normative forces may also induce managers to act in 
particular ways (e.g. Fishbein and Ajzen, 1980).  However, we do propose that each theory, 
resting on specific assumptions about human behavior, will generate distinct patterns of 
managerial action.   Also, our modeling of distinct theoretical elements is not intended to be 
exhaustive; instead, we try to build upon existing core debates in the literature (as briefly 
outlined in the introduction) and exploit possible associations between such contending 
elements involving different assumptions about human behavior.  In Figure 1, we graphically   6
represent our overall model, depicting how alternative managerial attitudes lead to specific 
forms of behaviors, which in turn, impact performance.       
<<Figure 1 around here>> 
  The level of analysis in our theoretical discussion is the organizational unit, which we 
define here as the group of organizational members reporting to a certain manager.
2  Our 
adopting this more fine-grained definition of “organization”—not necessarily the firm as a 
whole— is warranted, given that the practices emphasized by managers may be more 
effectively circumscribed to the group of people who reports to them. Thus, the unit should be 
the level at which the effects of managerial attitudes and behaviors are most salient.  For the 
same reason, the organizational unit is also the unit of accrual when evaluating performance; 
thus, we consider the performance of the unit instead of the performance of the firm as a 
whole.  Our conceptualization of performance is general: a high-performance unit is an 
organizational entity whose results (however defined or measured) are above managers’ initial 
expectations (e.g. Barney, 2002).
3  Notice that our definition of performance is tied to the 
perception of the manager of the unit; for simplicity, we do not discuss whether managers 
themselves are aligned or not with the objectives of the larger organization, if any, to which 
the organizational unit belongs.      
Theories based on the assumption of self-interest 
Agency 
  Agency theory focuses on settings where a “principal”—the owner of a company, the 
manager of a division, the supervisor of a team, etc.—is concerned with avoiding that 
“agents”—i.e. subordinates—engage in a series of undesirable behaviors such as shirking, 
accommodation, and lack of attention to certain aspects of the task (e.g., service quality).  The 
                                                 
2 For instance, if the focal manager is responsible for a bank branch, then the organizational unit is the bank 
branch itself; if the manager is responsible for the sales of a particular product, then the unit is the group of sales 
representatives that respond to the manager; if the manager is the CEO, then the unit is the company as a whole.   
3 As an example, a group of salespeople who sell 300 product units per month may be considered of high 
performance if the sales manager’s initial expectations of potential sales was, say, 100 units.     7
underlying assumption is that agents’ self-interest is misaligned with the principal’s 
objectives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Thus, if the set of behaviors valued by the principal 
impose costs to the agents, then—absent appropriate organizational mechanisms—the latter 
will tend to exert suboptimal effort (Gibbons, 1998; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), thereby 
dampening the performance of the organization. 
  Given their evaluation of agents’ self-interestedness, managers’ rational behavioral 
response, according to agency theory, will be to emphasize supervision, adopt performance-
contingent compensation contracts, or both (McLean Parks and Conlon, 1995).  Direct 
supervision of agents’ behavior, however, may be costly and even unfeasible when managers’ 
cannot directly observe what their subordinates are doing all the time and in all tasks 
performed (Brickley and Dark, 1987).  In this case, managers may craft incentive contracts 
that compensate the subordinate according to some observable performance indicator; such 
contingent compensation may involve, for instance, a monetary bonus conditional on certain 
individual and/or group-based targets (Knez and Simester, 2001; Lazear, 2000), as well as 
promotion schemes that are conditional on the individual’s past performance within the 
organizational unit (Brickley et al., 2002).  As a consequence of these managerial actions, 
agents’ self-interest will become, to some extent, more aligned with the overall objectives of 
the organizational unit; their rational response will be to engage in behaviors that are valued 
by their managers.  Therefore:      
Hypothesis 1.  (a) Managers who perceive agency problems as common will 
emphasize solving agency problems in their unit (e.g. direct supervision and/or 
performance-contingent compensation contracts); (b) as a consequence of this 
increased emphasis to solving agency problems, the performance of the unit will 
increase. 
Organizational politics   8
  Organizational politics involves social interactions through which individuals or 
groups of individuals attempt to influence others and affect the process of decision-making.  
Although some authors consider politics as a natural process characterizing the dynamics of 
organizations (e.g. Pfeffer, 1978), other authors adopt a more negative view by considering 
politics as a mechanism through which groups of individuals seek and defend their self-
interest.  Thus, politics can encompass “a variety of different types of opportunistic behavior” 
(Ferris et al., 1989: 143) or, more specifically, contexts where people “band together into 
small groups and are inattentive, perhaps even destructive, to the needs of others” 
(Cropanzano et al., 1997: 159).  Faced with such negative social interactions, some 
individuals will reduce their willingness to contribute to the organization and even depart 
(Ferris et al., 1989; Gandz and Murray, 1980), while others will excessively waste time and 
effort to influence decisions for their own benefit  instead of engaging in other actions that 
could otherwise increase the performance of the organizational unit as a whole (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1990).   
  Managers who perceive their personnel as politics-oriented and anticipate potential 
dysfunctional consequences are likely to respond in a variety of different ways.  They may 
simply diagnose the existing “clusters of interest” in organizations (Pfeffer, 1992: 340) and 
attempt at reconciling conflicting demands (Witt et al., 2000).  Managers may also establish 
rules and procedures so as to avoid excessive influence efforts; e.g., clear financial rules for 
the approval and funding of internal projects (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). As managers 
emphasize actions that help curb the extent to which factions within the organizational unit 
can succeed in seeking self-serving decisions, they are more likely to attain performance that 
is more consistent with their initial expectations.  Thus: 
Hypothesis 2.  (a) Managers who perceive politics as common will emphasize dealing 
with politicking among their team members (e.g. reconciling conflicting demands,   9
establishing rules etc.); (b) as a consequence of this increased emphasis to dealing 
with politicking, the performance of the unit will increase. 
Theories not based on the assumption of self-interest   
Shared cognition (mental models) 
While the former two approaches begin from an assumption of divergence of interests 
among organizational members, team cognition approaches have tended to emphasize how 
well functioning organizations capitalize on information sharing and collaborative dynamics. 
According to the team cognition approach (e.g. Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995), each member of 
an organizational unit must develop working mental representations of the job, its important 
features, and its requisites for high performance.  In this context, team members may 
genuinely diverge on the relevant aspects of the job that should lead to high performance, 
even when they share the same desired outcomes for the organization.  Consider, for instance, 
a team of salespeople who all agree that sales are unsatisfactorily low, but disagree on how to 
change the situation.  Some individuals may believe that increasing sales will require heavy 
advertising efforts, while others may argue that it will be necessary instead to aggressively 
lower the price of the product.  Differently from agency or organizational politics theories, in 
this case the source of conflict has to do with distinct cognitive representations of the task—
specifically, how particular actions map onto performance—instead of opposing self-interests 
(Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1997).     
Perceiving such cognitive divergences, managers will need to foster what the literature 
has termed “shared mental models” (Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 2001): unit members will 
need to develop accurate team-level conceptions of a given situation, understand the processes 
involved in improving organizational performance, and develop an accurate prediction of 
future events and appropriate behaviors within the workplace (Klimoski and Mohammed, 
1994; Weick and Roberts, 1993).  Shared mental models allow anticipation of others’ actions   10
and needs through shared knowledge, which improves coordination (Mathieu et al., 2000; 
Mohammed and Dumville, 2001) and leads to superior team performance (Waller et al., 
2004).  Consequently, managers who are concerned with the coordination of ideas and 
opinions in the team are more likely to emphasize a series of practices such as committees for 
the collective discussion of strategies (Jones, 2001), articulation of distinct points of view to 
build consensus (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004), mutual understanding of the roles and 
responsibilities of team members (Levesque et al., 2001), and so on.  Therefore: 
Hypothesis 3.  (a) Managers who perceive misalignment in mental models as common 
will emphasize creating shared mental models in their unit (e.g. establishing 
committees for discussion, fostering consensus etc.); (b) as a consequence of this 
increased emphasis to creating shared mental models, the performance of the unit will 
increase. 
Interactional justice 
While constructing shared mental models is important for the cognitive alignment of 
unit members, it leaves unaddressed the interpersonal link between members, a link which has 
been shown to be significant in organizational functioning (e.g. Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995).  
A large literature has been devoted to studying, in particular, how team members perceive 
outcomes and processes in the organizational to be fair or just.  While some scholars 
emphasize how individuals respond to inequity in compensation and effort across members 
(Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1985), we are particularly interested here in how managers develop 
distinct employee exchange relationships that build trust (Dienesch and Liden, 1986) and 
affect key emotional processes between leaders and subordinates (Bauer and Green, 1996).  
Such behaviors send signals to employees that they are being treated with dignity and respect, 
as well as being informed of managerial decisions (Colquitt et al., 2001).  These are important 
motivational factors which are grouped in the literature as “interactional justice” (Bies and   11
Moag, 1986), the lack of which causes a sense of injustice (Folger, 1984) with regards to 
superiors.
4   Individuals may value just treatment even in cases where organizational 
outcomes are not perfectly aligned their self-interest.  For instance, members’ resentment 
towards lower individual compensation may be ameliorated if managers express concern 
about the situation and justify the resulting outcome (Folger, 1986).          
Whether organizational policies are seen as fair depends to a large extent on whether 
those policies are transmitted in interpersonally sensitive and respectful ways (Bies and 
Shapiro, 1988).  Because such perceptions of fairness are important antecedents for 
performance (Colquitt et al., 2001), managers who perceive affective responses to be 
commonplace should foster fairness in social interactions with team members to augment the 
performance of their units.  Managers could, for instance, actively take into consideration 
suggestions by team members and justify why certain decisions were made (Korsgaard et al., 
1995), publicly recognize individuals who devoted high effort to organizational tasks (Brown 
and Leigh, 1996), express concern about the personal life of members and deal with stress 
(Graen and Scandura, 1987), among other actions that are expected to build a sense of justice.  
Thus: 
Hypothesis 4.  (a) Managers who perceive affective responses as common will 
emphasize creating a sense of interactional justice in their unit (e.g. justifying why 
decisions were made, expressing concern about members etc.); (b) as a consequence 
of this emphasis to fostering interactional justice, the performance of the unit will 
increase. 
Mixed attitudes and behaviors 
                                                 
4 There has been some debate in the literature as to whether interactional justice should be considered distinct 
from procedural justice (e.g. Bies, 2005).  In Colquitt et al.’s (2001) review, they found that interactional 
variables such as fair treatment and informing employees added variance over and above procedural justice.  
Because we are interested in how managers treat their subordinates in a broader sense, we focus on the 
interactional justice construct.    12
The theories discussed before predict distinct attitude-behavior relations based on a 
common idea: to increase organizational performance, managers will emphasize actions that 
are consistent with their assumptions about the intent of organizational members.  Indeed, the 
literature examining the behavioral foundations of managerial action has often portrayed two 
types of managers: individuals who believe that self-interest is pervasive and act accordingly, 
and individuals who are more concerned with motivation and team engagement (e.g. Davis et 
al., 1997; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Ghoshal, 2005; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).  
Some even propose that managerial behaviors intended to mitigate self-interest will actually 
signal distrust and further beget self-interest. As originally advanced by Strickland (1958), 
individuals may become less motivated to pursue organizational goals if they perceive the 
existence of external controls that are crafted to suppress defection (Deci and Ryan, 1985; 
Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Frey and Jegen, 2001).  Thus, the logic goes, managers who engage 
in actions that will inspire trust and motivate team members towards achieving collective 
goals should outperform other managers who simply try to curtail self-interest (Donaldson, 
2008; Osterloh and Frey, 2000). 
 We posit that such polarized view of managers deserves careful revision, because in 
practice managers may engage in a mixed, complex set of actions that do not simply follow 
the tenets of a single perspective on human behavior.  In particular, we posit that attitudes 
related to self-interest may influence behaviors not necessarily related to self-interest, and that 
attitudes not related to self-interest may affect behaviors not devised to address self-interest.  
In other words, we expect cross associations between the attitudes and behaviors emanating 
from distinct theories.  Although several effects can be outlined along these lines, we focus on 
four major possibilities that can receive theoretical underpinning.   
We first examine the interplay between agency and justice.  Managers who perceive a 
concern for justice in the organizational unit may also engage in agency-related actions that   13
allow them to better deal with affective responses.  Suppose, for instance, that a manager 
would like to provide team members with useful feedback regarding their individual 
performance.  If managers, at the outset, establish reasonable goals and clear criteria to 
evaluate and compensate individual performance—behaviors that typically follow from 
agency theory—then it should become easier for these managers to judge whether team 
members met initial performance expectations or not, and whether their actions should be 
corrected or praised (through monetary rewards or otherwise).  This argument is reminiscent 
of recent discussions in the literature regarding how  explicit contracts can facilitate the 
development of relationships by creating procedures through which parties compare actual 
performance to initial expectations and mutually adjust if necessary (Mayer and Argyres, 
2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).  In addition, if managers closely monitor team members, the 
observability of their actions will increase (Brickley et al., 2002), thereby allowing managers 
to identify those who need to be publicly recognized, and those who deserve more careful 
attention and coaching.  Thus:         
Hypothesis 5.  Managers who perceive affective responses as common will also 
emphasize in their unit actions that are consistent with solving agency problems. 
In the same vein, we posit that agency-oriented managers are also likely to engage in 
justice-related behaviors.  Our logic is that managers may anticipate that actions devised to 
curb self-interest will also create negative responses which may require extra managerial 
effort.  Suppose, for instance, that an aggressive bonus scheme is introduced in the 
organizational unit.  Given that individuals tend to have inflated perceptions of their own 
contribution to the organization (Nickerson and Zenger, 2008; Zenger, 1992), managers 
should expect complaints by those whose compensation is significantly below others.  To 
avoid negative downstream consequences (e.g. departure or sabotage), managers may invest 
considerable effort to justify decisions and “frame” the differential compensation scheme as a   14
mechanism to reward those who excel instead of a procedure to punish particular members 
(e.g. Luft, 1994).  Therefore:  
Hypothesis 6.  Managers who perceive agency problems as common will also 
emphasize in their unit actions that are consistent with creating a sense of 
interactional justice. 
The second set of interactions we examine involves theories related to organizational 
politics and shared cognition.  Because organizational politics may be related to the formation 
of interpersonal factions based on shared beliefs and identities (e.g. Ashforth and Mael, 
1989), we submit that managers who view creating shared mental models as important should 
also stress dealing with organizational politics.  Distinct factions in the organizational unit 
with diverging interests should also leave room for political-oriented behavior whereby 
subordinates try to influence managers towards their specific goals, even when they genuinely 
think that these goals are aligned with the interests of the organization as a whole.  Thus, 
managers who are sensitive to shared cognition problems should also respond by adopting 
behaviors consistent with dealing with politicking, such as listening to distinct factions, 
creating rules and procedures to approve certain projects, and so on.  Our logic leads to: 
Hypothesis 7.  Managers who perceive misalignment in mental models as common 
also emphasize in their unit actions that are consistent with dealing with politicking. 
Lastly, we expect that managers who perceive self-interested politicking to be 
prevalent are also more likely to adopt behaviors consistent with creating shared mental 
models.  To deal with self-interested factions, managers can try to show that achieving high 
organizational performance will require concerted actions and interests; i.e., they can try to 
align the “preferences” of alternative factions by creating shared understanding of common 
organizational goals (Vredenburgh and Maurer, 1984).  For instance, recent work has shown 
how strategic planning has changed from a tool to devise long-term actions to a mechanism   15
whereby distinct groups jointly discuss actions amalgamated by a common “vision” (e.g. 
Grant, 2003).  If clear goals are communicated and understood, then managers can economize 
on their efforts to handle politicking.  Hence, we arrive at: 
Hypothesis 8.  Managers who perceive politics as common will also emphasize in their 
unit actions consistent with creating shared mental models. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample and procedure 
We test our proposed hypotheses using a sample of 419 executives who recently 
acquired their MBA degree or are currently enrolled in executive MBA programs offered by 
either one of two business schools, located respectively in Brazil and the United States. 
Because we are interested in managerial behaviors towards subordinates, we selected only 
executives who currently supervise the work of others (e.g. a sales manager, the head of the 
finance department etc.). The average manager in our sample is 35.4 years old, being that 
their ages range from 21 to 67 years. We have a roughly equal distribution across gender 
(59% were male) and nationality (59% were US respondents). 
Our sample includes managers from both Brazil and the United States in order to 
increase the heterogeneity of our data. Data source heterogeneity is an important factor in 
hypothesis testing, because of the improved variance in the relevant variables to be explained. 
This improvement arises from the diversity in cultural attitudes and behaviors (Hofstede, 
1997; O'Keefe and O'Keefe, 2004). For the same reasons, we sampled across industries and 
organizations, rather than selecting a single organizational or industry focus.
5   
Measures 
                                                 
5 As stated earlier, we do not intend to propose nor test hypotheses related to country-specific effects. Our data 
are part of a larger cross-national project and, hence, we leave a detailed analysis of possible national and 
cultural differences to a future study.  We do, however, report some possible differences across subsamples in 
the “results and discussion” section.   16
We developed an initial questionnaire based on the four theoretical categories 
described in our model. This initial questionnaire was originally developed in English, then 
translated and back translated into Portuguese. This translation was performed by three people 
who are intimately familiar with both languages, being that two are native speakers of 
Portuguese and one is a native speaker of English. We conducted an initial exploratory factor 
analysis with the resulting sample. We selected items loading highly on the first factor of each 
subscale for the final version of the questionnaire.  Except where noted, all the following 
measures arise from 1-7 Likert-type scales.  
Organizational performance 
 We gauge performance with a 3-item measure. For this measure, we asked managers 
to rate the degree to which the performance of their units over the last three years (a) met their 
initial expectations, (b) fared well against similar units in other organizations, and (c) satisfied 
their general performance expectations.  This scale shows high reliability, as measured by its 
corresponding Chronbach’s α (α = 0.80).  
  While some have questioned the accuracy of self-ratings of performance (e.g. 
Anderson et al., 1984), suggesting that raters may inflate self-ratings, meta-analytic results 
have shown that this only tends to be the case in reward contexts (Mabe and West, 1982).  
These results, along with other empirical findings (e.g. Farh and Werbel, 1986), suggest that 
self-bias is apparent when rewards are at stake but not necessarily in research contexts.  In 
addition, several studies have empirically demonstrated that when raters know their results 
will be checked against other raters, self-biases disappear (Bauman and Dent, 1982; Farh and 
Werbel, 1986; Mabe and West, 1982).  For this reason, and also to guard against common 
method bias (e.g. Podsakoff et al., 2003), we additionally asked respondents to provide us 
with the name and contact of two of their subordinates.  We then checked a subsample of 
respondents’ answers against two other unit members in their organizations (in a total of 96   17
colleagues), who were interviewed by telephone after the initial data collection. Inter-rater 
agreement, as indexed by the average deviation (ADMd(J)) (Burke and Dunlap, 2002; Burke et 
al., 1999), is well below the cutoff criteria of 1 suggested in Burke & Dunlap (2002), with 
ADMd(J) = .26, indicating strong inter rater agreement. We are thus confident in the validity of 
our measures, for the purposes of our study. 
Managerial attitudes 
To measure agency-oriented attitudes (M= 4.22, SD = 1.08, α = 0.61) we gauge 
managers’ perceptions of the tendency for individuals to shirk in the absence of evaluation, 
monitoring and discipline (see the Appendix). When it comes to politically-oriented attitudes 
(M= 4.27,  SD = 1.09, α = 0.66) we gauge managers’ perceptions of faction-formation and 
favoritism seeking. Shared cognition attitudes (M=  4.47, SD = 1.17, α = 0.71) are composed 
of perceptions of the importance of communication and information sharing in the unit. 
Finally, justice perceptions (M=  5.02, SD = 1.28, α = 0.74) involve perceiving the 
importance of justifying managerial decisions, giving employees the feeling of inclusion and 
voice within the organization. 
Managerial behavior 
We measure agency, political, shared cognition, and justice behaviors by gauging the 
extent to which managers prioritize activities and policies respectively associated with such 
conduct. As such, agency related behaviors (M=  4.84, SD = 1.21,  α = 0.79) refer to actions 
involving performance evaluation and incentives based rewards and punishments (see the 
Appendix). The original agency behavior scale also includes “monitoring”. We decided to 
drop this item because of its low loading on the general factor. Given the centrality of 
monitoring behaviors to agency theory, however (e.g. McLean Parks and Conlon, 1995), we 
decided to include two separate measures of agency behavior in our model. One measure 
includes a single items, assessment of the degree to which managers monitor employees. The   18
other measure assesses the degree to which managers devise metrics, incentives, and 
evaluation mechanisms towards subordinates (for this latter scale, M= 3.83, SD = 1.57). 
Political behaviors (M= 4.16, SD = 1.34, α = .74) involve managing group differences and 
“diplomacy” between groups.  Behaviors oriented towards creating shared mental models 
(M= 4.94, SD = 1.28, α = 0.87) measure attempts to establish common beliefs and 
procedures, and communicating general managerial goals. Justice behaviors (M=  5.01, SD = 
1.29, α = 0.85) involve dealing with individual concerns, justifying organizational decisions, 
and establishing a climate of cordiality. Readers can find details for the wording of individual 
items in the Appendix.
6   
Control variables 
Because the relationships between attitudes, behaviors, and performance is complex 
and can be affected by various task characteristics in the work environment outside of the 
individual differences (Hackman and Wageman, 1995), and because we had sampled from 
across a wide range of varying work contexts, we included several control variables to 
improve the validity of our results. We controlled for various aspects of the organizational 
environment that may affect managerial action by asking to what extent the managers’ 
organizational units exhibited (a) task complexity (i.e. multifaceted tasks that require a great 
deal of coordination), (b) mutual dependence among organizational members, (c) strong 
                                                 
6 In addition to measuring behaviors as described in the above paragraph, we also analyze the extent to which 
managers prioritized some forms of behavior over others by estimating the total number of hours spent per week 
engaged in each type of activity. Because breaking down weekly behaviors into specific actions may have 
seemed too cumbersome to respondents, in the questionnaire we grouped activities by theoretical category 
(agency, political, shared cognition and justice), and asked respondents how many hours they spent on each 
category as a group. Given that multi-item measures are preferable to single items in terms of predictive validity 
(e.g. Churchill, 1979) and recommended in structural equation models (e.g. Anderson and Gerbing, 1988), and 
because hour-based scales are characterized by negative non-independence (Kenny et al., 2002), an ipsative 
feature that makes factor analysis problematic (Cornwell and Dunlap, 1994), we use the multi item priority scale 
in our analysis, rather than the hourly scale.  However, we use the hourly estimates as checks on the predictive 
validity of the behavioral scales described above.  In other words, an emphasis on one or the other type of 
behavioral priority should result in increased hours spent on that group of activities.  This is true in all cases.  
Agency behaviors related to evaluation and incentives, as well as monitoring-specific agency behaviors, are 
significantly correlated with hours spent in related activities (r = 0.33, p < 0.01 for the general measure, r = 0.38, 
p < 0.01 for the monitoring measure). The same is true for political behaviors (r = 0.15, p<.01), shared mental 
model behaviors (r = 0.19, p < 0.01), and interactional justice behaviors (r = 0.18, p<.01).   19
personal friendship bonds, and (d) active implementation of new technologies.  Several of 
these aspects may confound hypothesized relationships in our model.  For example, jobs 
requiring high levels of interdependence may require heightened effort towards creating 
shared mental models (Waller et al., 2004) regardless of managerial attitudes about such 
efforts. Also, jobs in which there is a high degree of complexity may invoke heightened 
justice concerns and treatment with dignity as a heuristic processes when one is not sure about 
individual contributions or outcomes (van den Bos, 2001).  We also include a control for the 
size of the company (number of employees); larger organizations may have deeper pockets 
than smaller ones regarding investing in necessary resources associated with high 
performance and may exhibit distinct patterns of interpersonal interaction (e.g. Zenger and 
Lazzarini, 2004). In addition, we include a measure of the “leniency” of managers towards 
their subordinates, which gauges the level of performance that they would expect to be 
appropriate given a certain hypothetical situation (see the Appendix).  This variable helps to 
control for possible differences across managers in their self-assessment of performance.  For 
instance, some managers may declare to be highly satisfied with the performance of their unit 
mostly because they held more lenient expectations at the outset.  Finally, we include a 
variable coding the country of origin of the respondent so as to control for country-specific 
heterogeneity; this variable is coded 1 and 2 if the respondent is from the U.S. and Brazil 
respectively. 
Estimation method 
We perform a structural equation analysis, which, by definition, is a hybrid of factor and 
path analysis. To implement the model, we follow the two-stage approach recommended by 
Anderson and Gerbing (1988). In the first stage, we use confirmatory factor analysis to test 
whether the variables selected to measure each construct show convergent validity (i.e., 
whether items are fairly correlated with one another) and discriminant validity (i.e., whether   20
variables across constructs clearly measure different constructs). Based on the measurement 
model found in this first stage, in the second stage we compute the path structural model.   
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Overview of the data 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix involving the 
variables used in the study. It is worth noticing that, contrary to the current debate in the 
literature suggesting polar types of managers (e.g., those concerned and not concerned with 
opportunism), there is no negative association between managerial attitudes based on 
perceptions of self-interest and attitudes based on problems other than self-interest.  Likewise, 
there is no negative association between managerial behaviors derived from perceptions of 
self-interest and behaviors unrelated to such perceptions.  Rather, attitudes and behaviors 
were either independent or positively correlated.  Thus, we interpret from our data that a 
manager who perceives agency problems to be common should not necessarily be less 
concerned with fairness and adequate treatment for team members. This suggests that 
managers who form strong attitudes about, and act accordingly with, the managerial 
paradigms laid forth above do not do so at the cost of ignoring other paradigms.  In the 
structural model shown below, we test some key elements of such paradigmatic “cross-talk”.  
<<Tables 1 through 3 around here>> 
Measurement model 
Tables 2 and 3 report results of our SEM analysis, based on our two-stage procedure. 
We follow Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) formal analysis for convergent validity by 
computing t-tests for factor loadings. We keep indicators for which factor loadings are greater 
than twice their standard errors. All items included in our multi item measure surpass that 
level. We also assess discriminant validity. Here, we use chi-square difference tests for   21
constrained and unconstrained models. The constrained model sets the covariance between 
two constructs equal to one; a significantly lower chi-square value for the unconstrained 
model supports the discriminant validity criterion. All multi-item constructs exhibit 
satisfactory discriminant validity. 
In Table 2 we present summary statistics for all models estimated in both stages as 
well as difference statistics for all tests of one model against another. As far as our test of the 
initial measurement model (model 1) is concerned, we look at chi-square and five other 
goodness-of-fit statistics: the goodness of fit index (GFI), the normed and the non-normed fit 
indices (NFI and NNFI), the comparative fit index (CFI), and the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA). A commonly accepted rule of thumb is that the first 4 fit indices 
should be greater than 0.90 (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988).
7  RMSEAs of 0.05 or less indicate 
good models. Probability levels on chi-square of 0.10 or higher are generally considered 
evidence of ideal models (Bentler, 1989). Because the chi-square statistic of model 1 is 
insignificant (p < 0.11), and because all goodness-of-fit indices are within the expected range, 
we conclude that this is a strong measurement model.  
Structural model 
We therefore proceed to compute the path model. Our theoretical model (model 2) has 
a significant chi-square, which could be cause for concern. In such cases, Anderson and 
Gerbing (1988) argue that the chi-square test is frequently not valid in applied settings, and 
recommend that this statistic be treated as a general goodness of fit index, but not as a 
                                                 
7 GFI indicates the relative amount of variance and covariance jointly explained by the model. The NNFI 
(Bentler and Bonnett, 1980) is defined as “the percentage of observed-measure covariation explained by a given 
measurement or structural model … that solely accounts for the observed measure variances” (Anderson and 
Gerbing, 1988: 421). NNFI is often viewed as a superior variation of the Bentler & Bonnett’s (1980) normed fit 
index (NFI) since it has been shown to be more robust in reflecting model fit regardless of sample size 
(Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; Bentler, 1989). Bentler’s (1989) CFI, is similar to the NNFI in that it provides an 
accurate assessment of fit regardless of sample size. The CFI tends to be more precise than the NNIF however in 
describing comparative model fit as it corrects for small sample size by subtracting the degrees of freedom from 
their corresponding χ
2 values (Bentler, 1989). RMSEA (root-mean-square error of approximation) incorporates 
both model complexity (expressed in the degrees of freedom) and sample size in the analysis, and is thus 
suggested for analyses relying on Maximum Likelihood (Browne and Cudeck, 1993) with smaller sample sizes.   22
statistical test in the strict sense. Many researchers use the informal criterion that the model 
may be acceptable if the chi-square value is less than twice the size of the degrees of freedom 
(Bentler, 1989). The fact that our model 2 chi-square of 251 is less than twice the degrees of 
freedom of 299 together with the fact that all other goodness of fit indices are within expected 
ranges (i.e. above 0.9, while RMSEA is below 0.05) indicates ours is a strong and acceptable 
theoretical model.  
As a follow-up step, we examine modification indices resulting from Lagrangian 
multiplier tests (Bentler, 1989) to see if any unspecified paths could be added to improve 
model fit. Here, we find it necessary to add a path from F3 (“attitude towards shared mental 
models”) to F2 (“attitude towards politicking”), and another path from F8 (“emphasis towards 
creating shared mental models”) to F7 (“emphasis towards dealing with politicking”). 
Anderson & Gerbing (1988) recommend that the addition of paths should be done only to the 
extent that such additional paths are justified theoretically.  As we discussed before, the 
multiple circumstances in which managers interact with their subordinates may several 
interactions between alternative attitudes and behaviors; thus, we believe that adding these 
additional paths is theoretically plausible.  Lastly, we trim off insignificant parameters 
estimates to obtain a most constrained version of the theoretical model; based on the marginal 
significance cutoff of p < 0.10, and z-statistic of 1.645, we drop the paths between “country of 
origin” and “attitude towards agency”, “attitude towards politicking”, “emphasis towards 
solving agency problems (monitoring)”, “emphasis towards solving agency problems 
(evaluation and incentives)”, and “emphasis towards dealing with politicking”.  
We also eliminate the control variables “size” and “leniency”, since they fail to 
provide significant results.  On the other hand, we retain control variables “complexity”, 
“dependent”, “technology” and “strong personal bonds”, since these factors seem to affect 
performance. We also retain other paths involving these control variables which significantly   23
affect performance, even if they do not represent significant effects when associated with 
other variables.  
As a result of the above mentioned changes, we specify our “best model” (model 3), as 
shown Figure 2. The chi-square statistic for model 3 is significant (χ
2 = 246.22; p>0.01), but 
represents a significant improvement from our theoretical model, model 2 (Δχ
2 = -5.32; p < 
0.001). We are also confident in model 3, given that our analysis of the other 5 fit indices 
indicates this to be a good model. Particularly, the first 4 fit indices are all above 0.9, whereas 
RMSEA is a mere 0.02. We thus accept model 3 as our “best model.”  
<< Figure 2 around here >> 
Attitude and behavior hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1a establishes a positive association between attitude towards agency 
problems and efforts towards solving agency problems. As the reader may remember (see the 
section “data and methods”), we split hypothesis 1a the behavioral measure of agency into 
two parts, based on whether the manager is emphasizing “monitoring” or “performance 
evaluation and incentives.”  Both associations are supported, and thus we conclude that 
hypothesis 1a is supported. The coefficients are positive (0.21 and 0.11 respectively) and 
statistically significant (p < 0.001 and 0.021 respectively). Regarding hypothesis 2a (attitude 
towards politicking positively associates with emphasis towards dealing with politicking), 
hypothesis 3a (attitude towards shared mental models positively associates with emphasis 
towards creating shared mental models), as well as hypothesis 4a (attitude towards justice 
positively associates with emphasis towards dealing with justice), they are all supported. The 
coefficients are all positive and statistically significant (b = 0.16; 0.1; 0.19 respectively, while 
p < 0.001; 0.05; 0.0001 respectively). 
Behavior and performance hypotheses   24
Although we find support our proposed associations between attitudes and their 
corresponding behaviors, we find only partial support for our proposed associations between 
behaviors and organizational performance. Specifically, hypothesis 1b is only partially 
supported. Particularly, the association between “emphasis towards solving agency problems 
(monitoring)” and “performance” is—contrary to expected—negative and statistically 
significant (b = -0.1; p < 0.072). On the other hand, as expected, the association between 
“emphasis towards solving agency problems (evaluation and incentives)” is positively 
associated with “performance” (b = 0.08; p < 0.1).  
Hypothesis 2b (emphasis towards dealing with politicking positively associates with 
performance) is not supported. As it can be seen in the theoretical model, the coefficient is 
positive, but not significant (b = 0.01; p > 0.1). We therefore drop this path from the “best 
model” (see Table 3). Hypothesis 3b (emphasis towards creating shared mental models 
positively associates with performance) is not supported either. As it can be seen in the 
theoretical model, the coefficient is not significantly different from zero (b = 0.00; p > 0.1). 
We therefore drop this path from the “best model” (see Table 3). Hypothesis 4b (emphasis 
towards dealing with justice positively associates with performance), in turn, is supported. 
The coefficient is positive and statistically significant (b = 0.09; p < 0.084). 
Associations between alternative attitudes and behaviors 
We obtain support for hypothesis 5. This hypothesis predicts a positive association 
between attitude towards justice and emphasis towards solving agency problems (both 
measured as “monitoring” and as “evaluation and incentives”). The coefficients are positive 
and statistically significant (b = 0.14 and 0.13 respectively; p < 0.001 in both cases). On the 
other hand, we obtain no support for the remaining hypotheses predicting other cross 
associations between alternative attitudes and behaviors. As it can be seen in Table 3, we drop 
these paths from the theoretical model in our pursuit for the “best model.”    25
In addition to the support for some of the theorized hypotheses above, we report here 
two effects that were added to the model (see our discussion of Lagrangian analysis, in the 
methods section above). We find that variable “attitude towards shared mental models” has a 
positive association with “attitude towards politicking.” The path is positive and statistically 
significant (b = 0.22; p < 0.0001). We also find that variable “emphasis towards creating 
shared mental models” positively associates with “emphasis towards dealing with 
politicking.” The path is positive and statistically significant (b = 0.26; p < 0.0001). 
Controls  
Regarding controls, we find that “country of origin” matters for whether managers 
have an attitude towards shared mental models and justice. In this regard, Brazilians tend to 
show a broader perception that shared mental models and justice are the norm among people 
in the workplace (b = 0.1 and 0.11 respectively; p < 0.05 and 0.06 respectively). We also find 
that country of origin matters for behaviors towards creating shared mental models and 
justice, being that U.S. managers have a larger tendency to work towards these ends vis-à-vis 
their Brazilian counterparts (b = 0.12 and 0.09 respectively; p < 0.04 and 0.05 respectively).  
It is interesting to note that, although Brazilian managers apparently perceive problems of 
shared cognition and justice to a greater extent than their U.S. counterparts, the latter 
apparently place more emphasis on the behaviors corresponding to these theoretical 
perspectives.  Although, as discussed before, we find that attitudes tend to inspire their 
predicted corresponding behaviors, apparently there are other contextual, country-specific 
factors that may also affect behavior beyond attitudes per se (e.g. Fishbein and Ajzen, 1980).  
We, however, find that country of origin matters nothing when it comes both to attitude 
towards agency problems as well as behaviors towards dealing with agency problems 
(measured in both ways).    26
From our set of controls, we also conclude that teams dealing with more complex 
tasks tend to have higher performance. The path is positive and significant (b = 0.19; p < 
0.001). “Complexity,” however does not affect any form of behavior in the firm. Although we 
are tempted to drop these paths from the set of behaviors in our model, Anderson & Gerbing 
(1988) recommend we retain these paths, as “complexity” has a significant correlation with 
another associated variable (i.e. “performance”). Whether team members depend on one 
another also seems to affect performance and distinct forms of behavior the same way as 
complexity does. The path coefficient of “dependent” to “performance” is positive and 
significant (b = 0.11; p < 0.1), although the paths to the various forms of behavior are not 
significant. The same types of effects occur for whether team members tend to form stronger 
friendship bonds. The path coefficient of “strong personal bonds” to “performance” is 
significantly positive (b = 0.12; p < 0.004), even if the paths to each form of behavior is not 
significant.   Lastly, we find support for the role of “technology” (i.e. whether the 
organizational deals with new technologies) in explaining performance differences (b = 0.11; 
p < 0.086).   
Discussion 
Our data are inconsistent with the received simplified depiction of managers as either 
exclusively expressing concern about self-interest or emphasizing organizational problems 
not related to self-interest.  Rather, we find that the same manager may engage in behaviors 
that are consistent with perceptions of both self-interest and other problems not strictly related 
to self-interest.  Possibly, the multiple ways in which managers interact with their 
subordinates leave room for distinct assessments of intentions depending on the particular 
context of the interaction (Lewicki et al., 1998).  For instance, in a team of salespeople, the 
sales manager may fear that, in a period of crisis, members may aggressively pursue price 
cuts at the expense of service profitability; at the same time, the manager may perceive that   27
members will positively respond to actions that elicit a sense of teamwork.  The manager may 
then respond by simultaneously monitoring pricing decisions and engaging members in 
collective decisions about how to circumvent the crisis.  Thus, managers who more likely 
perceive self-interest to be common in organizations should not necessarily be less perceptive 
of other problems unrelated to self-interest.  Likewise, managers who more likely engage in 
behaviors consistent with curtailing self-interest should not necessarily be less engaged in 
behaviors which do not address self-interest.  
Our data also indicate that alternative theories can equally explain organizational 
performance.  For instance, a manager who believes that team members value interactional 
justice can increase performance by emphasizing a series of actions that promote justice; 
likewise, a manager who believes self-interest to be a problem can increase performance by 
emphasizing agency-oriented actions such as evaluation and incentives.  It is worth noticing, 
however, that in our data monitoring shows a negative effect on performance.  This result is 
consistent with discussions dating back to Strickland (1958), suggesting that direct 
supervision may backfire due to its potentially strong message of lack of trust in the 
workplace.  Although we could not find significant performance effect for actions that 
emphasize dealing with politicking and creating shared mental models, our data indicate that 
managers have multiple ways to increase organizational performance based on distinct 
theoretical perspectives. 
Furthermore, the data also reveal an interesting positive association between attitudes 
based on justice and behaviors emphasizing agency (specifically, performance evaluation and 
incentives).  This result is consistent with our point that performance metrics and incentives 
can function as complementary mechanisms to foster justice.  Namely, managers can use pre-
specified objective goals to set clear expectations at the outset, and then use incentives to 
“reciprocate” those who met or exceeded expectations.  It is also interesting to see that there is   28
an asymmetry in the data: managers who perceive agency problems to be common do not 
emphasize actions to promote justice (except, of course, if they also perceive justice to be 
important).  Also, we do not find support for predicted interactions between other alternative 
theories (shared cognition and politics).   
Overall, our study indicates stronger attitude-behavior-performance effects, as well as 
interactions, involving theories of agency and interactional justice; the other theories (politics 
and shared cognition) fail to receive broader support in our data (except for their predicted 
direct attitude-behavior paths).  The added significant paths involving politics and shared 
cognition attitudes and behaviors (model 3), however, reveal some interplay between attitudes 
and behaviors involving those two theoretical perspectives: managers who tend to perceive 
political problems as relevant also tend to be concerned with shared cognition; and managers 
who emphasize dealing with politicking also emphasize creating shared mental models. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  Because managerial behaviors are expected to follow managers’ psychological 
evaluation about the intent of team members, scholars have devoted increasing attention to 
various theories of how managers behave and how their actions impact organizational 
performance.  Thus far, the literature has drifted towards a polarized view of managers as 
either individuals concerned with mitigating self-interest or individuals who actively motivate 
and engage team members in the pursuit of common organizational goals.  Differently from 
this view, we find that managers exhibit complex attitudes and behaviors that do not reflect a 
single implicit theory of human behavior in the workplace.  Respondents in our sample of 
U.S. and Brazilian managers appear to hold attitudes that are consistent with both 
opportunistic and non-opportunistic views of their subordinates.  They also appear to adopt 
behaviors that blend recommendations consistent with multiple theories; for instance, we find   29
that managers who are concerned with justice not only emphasize practices to foster justice, 
but also practices that directly follow from agency theory (e.g. evaluation and incentives). 
  Our study therefore indicates that management theories based on distinct patterns of 
attitudes and behaviors can complement one another.  More specifically, the current debate 
about whether managers are or should be concerned with self-interest is misleading because 
distinct theoretical views can potentially explain organizational performance and managers 
can develop mixed attitudes and behaviors based on distinct assumptions about human 
behavior.  The multiple instances and events in which managers and their subordinates leave 
room for varying attitudes and behaviors that depart from distinct assumptions and affect 
organizational performance in varying ways.  Thus, by carefully outlining the predictions of 
distinct theories and exploring their possible interactions, our study provides a broader and 
more complete picture of the relationship between managerial attitudes, managerial behavior 
and organizational performance.  Furthermore, our study is able to explain heterogeneity in 
organizational performance—a focal issue in strategic management research (Barney, 
2002)—building upon mechanisms that derive from heterogeneity in terms of attitudes and 
behaviors adopted by managers in their organizational units.  Thus, we provide psychological 
underpinning to the study of how managers can create competitive advantage through internal 
organizational choices. 
Admittedly, our study has some limitations, which can be addressed by future 
research.  As we noted before, our selection of theories was limited, in a way that could allow 
us to describe particular managerial actions and their relationship with organizational 
performance.  To be sure, several other theories could be outlined.  For instance, one could 
also discuss how distributive (instead of interactional) justice could influence managerial 
action in the workplace, and how the concern with distributive justice could interact with 
other theoretical frameworks.  Zenger (1992), for instance, discusses how perceptions of   30
potential inequity in pay can pose constraints on managers’ use of performance-pay 
incentives. 
In addition, the fact that our sample involves managers working in different functions 
and sectors has the advantage of increasing the range of behaviors and tasks to which our 
model can be applied, but has the downside that we had to rely on subjective evaluations of 
team performance.  Although we took measures to reduce bias involved in such metrics, one 
could alternatively focus on a single sector or activity and then try to collect standardized data 
about performance. For instance, one could perform a survey with managers of bank branches 
and then use more objective metrics such as revenues per employee, growth in the number of 
accounts, and so on.  Replicating our study in particular function- or industry-specific 
contexts would therefore allow for additional validation of the results reported here, even 
though with perhaps less generalizability. 
Another important issue is that, given that we rely on cross-sectional data, we cannot 
precisely infer causality.  Although we included several controls to avoid spurious causation, 
it would be desirable to adopt alternative research designs involving longitudinal data and 
laboratory experiments, so we can more directly verify the proposed notion that managerial 
attitudes (based or not on self-interest) lead to specific managerial actions which, in turn, 
should affect performance. 
Relatedly, although we show that managers tend to used mixed theoretical 
perspectives towards their subordinates, we do not examine how finely grained such mixing 
may be.  While our results suggest that, in general, managerial perspectives are complex, it 
may be that in any given situation or moment, managers use one or another more specific 
perspective.  Because we do not focus on discrete situations, we show that the general profiles 
of managers are complex; however, their attitudes and behaviors at a given state or point in   31
time may be more focused.  Future research should explore the level of generality at which 
our results hold. 
Finally, although we treat country-specific heterogeneity in our data purely as post-hoc 
findings instead of hypothesized effects, we do make inroads into theoretical perspectives that 
apparently hold across countries.  With a larger diversity of countries, one could strive for 
further generalization, while assessing how particular cultural traits affect managerial attitudes 
and influence organizational performance.  In this sense, future research could not only 
theorize about the consequences of certain managerial attitudes, but also describe and explain 
how attitudes are shaped by the cultural and institutional environments surrounding managers 
and influencing the practices that they employ to create competitive advantage. 
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Figure 2.  Best model 
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics 
 
M e a n S . D . 1234567891 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5
1 Performance 3.57 0.69 1.00
2 Attitude towards agency 4.21 1.09 0.01 1.00
3 Attitude towards politicking 4.27 1.09 -0.05 0.43** 1.00
4 Attitude towards mental models 4.47 1.17 -0.09 0.28** 0.47** 1.00
5 Attitude towards justice 5.02 1.28 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.01 1.00
6
Emphasis towards agency (evaluation 
and incentives) 4.84 1.21 0.09† 0.11* 0.18** 0.04 0.36** 1.00
7 Emphasis towards agency (monitoring) 3.83 1.57 -0.11† 0.31** 0.18** 0.14** 0.09 0.27** 1.00
8 Emphasis towards politicking 4.16 1.34 -0.03 0.15** 0.19** 0.15** 0.16* 0.32** 0.24** 1.00
9 Emphasis towards mental models 4.94 1.28 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.17* 0.29** 0.21** 0.32** 1.00
10 Emphasis towards justice 5.01 1.29 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.22** 0.24** 0.19** 0.26** 0.45** 1.00
11 Complexity 5.38 1.22 0.18* -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01 1.00
12 Dependent 5.24 1.54 0.11* 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.10† 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.32** 1.00
13 Technology 4.36 1.84 0.11† 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.10† 0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.12* 0.23** 0.17** 1.00
14 Size 17345 51222 -0.05 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.07 0.07 0.04 0.09† 1.00
15 Leniency NA NA 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 1.00
16 Personal bonds 4.75 1.43 0.18* 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.16* 0.12* 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.18* 0.12** 0.23** 0.15** -0.09† 0.05




Table 2.  Goodness of fit indices for the structural equation model 
 
Model Name Chi-Sq Df Probability GFI NFI NNFI CFI RMSEA
1 Measurement 183.4 317 0.112 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.980 0.01
2 Theoretical 249.44 298 >0.01 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.930 0.04
3 Best model 245.12 309 >0.01 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.975 0.02  
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Path Path Critical ratio
H1a' PF1PF5 Attitude towards agency problems --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (monitoring) 0.20 0.21 0.000
H1a'' PF1F6 Attitude towards agency problems --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (evaluation, incentives) 0.11 0.11 0.021
H1b' PF5F10 Emphasis towards solving agency problems (monitoring) --> Performance of unit -0.09 -0.10 0.072
H1b'' PF6F10 Emphasis towards solving agency problems (evaluation, incentives) --> Performance of unit 0.08 0.08 0.099
H2a PF2F7 Attitude towards politicking --> Emphasis towards dealing with Politickinig 0.17 0.16 0.001
H2b PF7F10 Emphasis towards dealing with politicking --> Performance of unit 0.01 0.727
H3a PF3F8 Attitude towards shared mental models --> Emphasis towards creating shared mental models 0.10 0.10 0.050
H3b PF8F10 Emphasis towards creating shared mental models --> Performance of unit 0.00 0.820
H4a PF4F9 Attitude towards justice --> Emphasis towards dealing with justice 0.18 0.19 0.000
H4b PF9F10 Emphasis towards dealing with justice --> Performance of unit 0.09 0.09 0.084
H5' PF4F5 Attitude towards justice --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (monitoring) 0.16 0.14 0.001
H5'' PF4F6 Attitude towards justice --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (evaluation, incentives) 0.12 0.13 0.008
H6 PF1F9 Attitude towards agency problems --> Emphasis towards justice -0.03 0.194
H7 PF3F7 Attitude towards shared mental models --> Emphasis towards dealing with politicking 0.05 0.141
H8 PF2F8 Attitude towards politicking --> Emphasis towards creating shared mental models 0.06 0.142
added effect PF3F2 Attitude towards shared mental models --> Attitude towards politicking 0.22 0.000
added effect PF8F7 Emphasis towards creating shared mental models --> Emphasis towards dealing with politickinig 0.26 0.000
Control PCTR1F1 Country of origin --> Attitude towards agency problems 0.02 0.278
Control PCTR1F2 Country of origin --> Attitude towards politicking 0.06 0.134
Control PCTR1F3 Country of origin --> Attitude towards shared mental models 0.10 0.10 0.050
Control PCTR1F4 Country of origin --> Attitude towards justice 0.11 0.11 0.051
Control PCTR1F5 Country of origin --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (monitoring) -0.05 0.181
Control PCTR1F6 Country of origin --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (evaluation, incentives)  0.05 0.178
Control PCTR1F7 Country of origin --> Emphasis towards dealing with politicking 0.06 0.156
Control PCTR1F8 Country of origin --> Emphasis towards creating shared mental models -0.12 -0.12 0.043
Control PCTR1F9 Country of origin --> Emphasis towards justice -0.10 -0.09 0.059
Control PCTR2F5 Complexity --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (monitoring) 0.01 0.01 0.240
Control PCTR2F6 Complexity --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (evaluation, incentives) 0.03 0.03 0.200
Control PCTR2F7 Complexity --> Emphasis towards dealing with polilticking 0.02 0.02 0.480
Control PCTR2F8 Complexity --> Emphasis towards creating shared mental models 0.02 0.03 0.510
Control PCTR2F9 Complexity --> Emphasis towards justice 0.04 0.04 0.470
Control PCTR2F10 Complexity --> Performance 0.19 0.20 0.000
Control PCTR3F5 Dependent --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (monitoring) 0.02 0.01 0.810
Control PCTR3F6 Dependent --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (evaluation, incentives)  0.03 0.03 0.650
Control PCTR3F7 Dependent --> Emphasis towards dealing with polilticking 0.01 0.02 0.712
Control PCTR3F8 Dependent --> Emphasis towards creating shared mental models 0.02 0.01 0.856
Control PCTR3F9 Dependent --> Emphasis towards justice 0.03 0.03 0.512
Control PCTR3F10 Dependent --> Performance 0.11 0.10 0.071
Control PCTR4F5 Personal bonds --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (monitoring) 0.01 0.02 0.711
Control PCTR4F6 Personal bonds --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (evaluation, incentives)  0.03 0.04 0.420
Control PCTR4F7 Personal bonds --> Emphasis towards dealing with polilticking 0.02 0.01 0.782
Control PCTR4F8 Personal bonds --> Emphasis towards creating shared mental models 0.05 0.00 0.921
Control PCTR4F9 Personal bonds --> Emphasis towards justice 0.06 0.02 0.799
Control PCTR4F10 Personal bonds --> Performance 0.15 0.12 0.004
Control PCTR6F5 Size --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (monitoring) 0.06
Control PCTR6F6 Size --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (evaluation, incentives) 0.02
Control PCTR6F7 Size --> Emphasis towards dealing with Polilticking 0.05
Control PCTR6F8 Size --> Emphasis towards creating shared mental models 0.01
Control PCTR6F9 Size --> Emphasis towards justice 0.06
Control PCTR6F10 Size --> Performance 0.00
Control PCTR5F5 Technology --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (monitoring) 0.04 0.04 0.550
Control PCTR5F6 Technology --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (evaluation, incentives)  0.03 0.02 0.802
Control PCTR5F7 Technology --> Emphasis towards dealing with politicking 0.04 0.03 0.716
Control PCTR5F8 Technology --> Emphasis towards creating shared mental models 0.01 0.01 0.842
Control PCTR5F9 Technology --> Emphasis towards justice 0.01 0.01 0.871
Control PCTR5F10 Technology --> Performance 0.11 0.11 0.086
Control PCTR7F5 Leniency --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (monitoring) 0.02
Control PCTR7F6 Leniency --> Emphasis towards solving agency problems (evaluation, incentives)  0.04
Control PCTR7F7 Leniency --> Emphasis towards dealing with politicking 0.03
Control PCTR7F8 Leniency --> Emphasis towards creating shared mental models 0.01
Control PCTR7F9 Leniency --> Emphasis towards justice 0.06
Control PCTR7F10 Leniency --> Performance 0.00
Note.   † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.001; *** p<0.001.  Convariances were not included here, for parsimony (available from the authors upon request)
Best model (model 3)
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APPENDIX 
Construct items and related survey questions 
 
Attitudinal scales (perception of problem) 
 
For each statement below, please indicate your level of agreement, in the 1-7 scale, regarding your perception of beliefs and 
attitudes of the people working in your unit. 
 
Agency 
a.  When they are not directly monitored, people devote little time and effort to their work related activities. 
b.  People work better when they are held more strictly for the results of their work. 
c.  People spend more time in activities where the outcomes of their effort are easily visible than in those where 
outcomes are less visible, regardless of the value of the activity to their organization. 
Politicking 
a.  People value being popular more than they value benefiting the organization as a whole 
b.  People tend to form close-knit, exclusive groups 
c.  People tend to overemphasize their own achievements and downplay the achievements of others in their 
organization 
Shared mental models 
a.  Although people have good intentions in general, they often disagree about the direction their organization should 
take 
b.  People don’t agree on how their organization should be managed in its daily activities 
c.  People often seem like they are working for a variety of different goals 
Interactional justice 
a.  People may become sad if their contribution is not recognized by their superiors and their organization as a whole 
b.  People need to feel that they are an important part of their organization 
c.  People tend to perform better when they genuinely like their organization as a whole 
d.  Happy workers perform better than unhappy ones 
 
Behavioral scales (emphasis given to each action) 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you prioritize the following activities in your day-to-day work schedule within your unit 
(1-7 scale, from “very low priority” to “very high priority”).  
 
Agency – performance evaluation and incentives 
a.  Establishing performance metrics for your subordinates 
b.  Evaluating the performance of your subordinates 
c.  Establishing ways to incentivize good performance through rewards/punishments 
Agency – monitoring 
a.  Monitoring and supervising the day-by-day activities of your subordinates 
Politicking 
a.  Negotiating with groups and factions requesting favors and benefits 
b.  Establishing clear rules and procedures to avoid power struggles 
c.  Dealing with internal conflicts between groups over resources 
Shared mental models 
a.  Communicating what is expected of everybody and what is the overall objective of the unit or organization 
b.  Trying to help people within the unit understand the importance of each other’s work 
c.  Getting points of view about ways to improve the unit 
d.  Building consensus among people who genuinely want to contribute to the organization but have different 
viewpoints 
Interactional justice 
a.  Publicly recognizing the value of individuals and groups in the unit 
b.  Building a culture of cordiality within the unit 




a.  The performance of my unit in the last three years has been: 1) Far below my expectations 2) Below my 
expectations 3) Equivalent to my expectations 4) Above my expectations 5) Far above my expectations 
b.  The performance of my unit in the last three years has been 1) Much less than satisfactory 2) Less than satisfactory 
3) Satisfactory 4) Higher than satisfactory 5) Much higher than satisfactory 
c.  Compared to similar units in other organizations, my unit’s performance in the last three years has been 1) Far 




Complexity (scale: 1-7) 
Members of your unit perform tasks that involve either a large number of steps, high levels of coordination, or are 
multifaceted in nature (that is, they are comprised of several relevant performance attributes). 
Dependent (scale: 1-7) 
Members of your unit depend on each other to effectively perform their tasks 
Personal friendship bonds (scale: 1-7) 
Members of your unit maintain strong personal friendship bonds 
Technology (scale: 1-7) 
Your unit’s work involves the rapid introduction of new technologies, products or services over time 
Size 
Approximately how many employees does your company have?  
Leniency 
Imagine the following situation and respond as if you were the Director of Sales in the company described:  “A Sales 
Associate in your company has the job of selling as many units per month as possible. At the end of the year, you must 
evaluate his/her performance, based on his/her average monthly sales.  Recently, individual monthly sales have been as 
low as 0 units, and as high as 200 units, with an average of 100 units.” 
a. How would you evaluate the goal of selling 100 units/month? (scale: 1-5) 1) It is too aggressive; goal could be much 
lower… 3) It is at a satisfactory level… 5) It is too easy; could be much higher. 
b. What would be the goal that you, as Director of Sales, would recommend for your sales associates? (units per month). 
 